Dynamic key ring update mechanism for mobile wireless sensor networks by Şahin, Merve et al.
Dynamic Key Ring Update Mechanism for Mobile 
Wireless Sensor Networks  
Merve Şahin 
Sabancı University 
Istanbul, Turkey 
mervesahin@sabanciuniv.edu  
Albert Levi 
Sabancı University 
Istanbul, Turkey 
levi@sabanciuniv.edu
Abstract—Key distribution is an important issue to provide 
security in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs). Many of the key 
pre-distribution schemes proposed for static WSNs perform 
poorly when they are applied to Mobile Wireless Sensor 
Networks (MWSNs). In this paper, we propose Dynamic Key 
Ring Update (DKRU) mechanism for MWSNs. The aim of 
DKRU mechanism is to enable sensor nodes to update their key 
rings periodically during movement, by observing the frequent 
keys in their neighbors. Our mechanism can be used together 
with different key pre-distribution schemes and it helps to 
increase the performance of them. For the performance 
evaluation basis, we used our mechanism together with a location 
based key pre-distribution scheme. Our results show that DKRU 
mechanism increases the local and global connectivity when it is 
applied to MWSNs. Moreover, our mechanism does not cause a 
significant degradation in network resiliency.    
Index Terms—mobile wireless sensor networks, key ring update, 
security, resiliency, connectivity 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs), consisting of small, 
autonomous devices called sensor nodes, have increasing range 
of application areas such as military surveillance, 
environmental tracking, patient monitoring and smart home 
applications [1]. All these applications convey sensitive data, 
so they require a secure communication medium among the 
sensor nodes and the base station (sink node), where the data is 
collected. However, sensor nodes have many limitations that 
make it complicated to develop security protocols for WSNs. 
A promising solution on key distribution, which is suitable 
for most of the requirements and limitations of WSNs, is 
proposed by Eschenauer and Gligor [2] in 2002. This scheme is 
based on the notion of the pre-distribution of keying material. It 
will be referred as the basic scheme throughout the paper. 
Many studies in the literature are based on this basic notion 
such as the matrix based, polynomial based, combinatorial 
design based and location based approaches [3].  
All these solutions mentioned for the key distribution 
problem in WSNs assumes that the sensor nodes are static. 
However, many applications areas of WSNs require the sensor 
nodes to be mobile. Our unpublished initial analysis shows that 
random and location based key distribution schemes perform 
poorly in Mobile Wireless Sensor Networks (MWSNs). 
Unfortunately, there is an important gap in the literature for the 
key distribution in MWSNs.  
The aim of this study is to turn the node mobility into 
advantage by providing a smart key ring update mechanism for 
sensor nodes. Using this mechanism, sensor nodes can re-
organize their key rings with the help of the base stations in the 
area. This mechanism can be used together with different key 
pre-distribution schemes. Regardless of the initial key pre-
distribution scheme, our mechanism increases the local and 
global connectivity values, without an important decrease in 
resiliency. Moreover, it does not require an increase in the key 
ring size and it causes only a small amount of communication 
overhead. In this paper, we use a deployment knowledge based 
scheme proposed in [4] for the key pre-distribution.  Then we 
apply our dynamic key ring update (DKRU) mechanism and 
measure the global connectivity, local connectivity, resiliency 
and communication overhead of the network via simulations. 
According to our simulation results, DKRU mechanism 
provides almost perfect global connectivity and increases the 
local connectivity by almost 40%, without a significant change 
in resiliency and communication overhead.    
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, 
related work about key distribution in WSNs and MWSNs are 
summarized. Section III gives background information about 
the mobility models appropriate for MWSNs. The proposed 
mechanism is explained in Section IV. Section V presents the 
performance evaluation of the proposed scheme comparatively 
and Section VI concludes the paper. 
II. RELATED WORK 
The scheme proposed in [2] (also called the basic scheme) 
is composed of three phases. In the key pre-distribution phase, 
a random set of keys are chosen from a large key pool and 
loaded to the memory of each sensor node, together with the 
key identifiers (IDs). These keys form the key ring of the node. 
After deployment, shared key discovery phase starts. In this 
phase, sensor nodes broadcast their key identifiers in clear text. 
If two nodes are in communication range of each other and if 
they share at least one common key, then they can 
communicate securely using symmetric encryption. If a pair of 
nodes does not share any common keys, they are provided with 
a path key in the path key establishment phase. 
The disadvantage of basic scheme is that it brings a tradeoff 
between connectivity and security. As the key ring size 
increases, the probability of forming a secure link between two 
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nodes also increases. However, the network becomes less 
resilient to node capture attacks. To strengthen the security of 
basic scheme, different methods are proposed such as [5] and 
[6]. In -composite random key pre-distribution scheme [5], 
two nodes are required to share at least  common keys to form 
a secure link. Moreover, the communication key is generated 
as the hash of all shared keys between these two nodes.   
To achieve better connectivity and resiliency than the 
random key pre-distribution schemes, some of the studies use 
other information such as the deployment location of sensor 
nodes. The scheme proposed by Du et al. [4] (will be referred 
as Du's scheme) utilizes the fact that sensor nodes will be 
deployed as groups, so this deployment knowledge can be used 
to give common keys only to the neighboring groups, thus 
increasing connectivity. In this scheme, sensor nodes are 
divided into groups, and a key pool is designed for each group. 
The key pools of horizontally, vertically or diagonally 
neighboring groups have certain amounts of overlapping keys. 
However, two non-neighboring key pools do not share any key. 
Groups of nodes are deployed with grid pattern and 
deployment points follow a two dimensional Gaussian 
distribution within each grid cell. Then, basic scheme is applied 
within each group.  
The problem with location based schemes is that, when 
they are applied to MWSNs, usage of deployment knowledge 
becomes a disadvantage as time progresses. In [7], it is showed 
that the location based schemes do not have any superiority 
over random key pre-distribution schemes regarding the 
MWSNs. Moreover, for certain mobility models, location 
based schemes may perform far worse than the probabilistic 
schemes.  
Although there is limited work in literature for the  key 
distribution problem in MWSNs, some schemes designed for 
static networks can be applied to mobile networks to some 
extent such as [8] and [9]. The approach proposed [10] uses the 
post deployment knowledge of sensor nodes to prioritize their 
keys in MWSNs. This study requires the existing of a location 
finding system and high amount of additional memory to 
achieve a reasonable connectivity level. The scheme proposed 
in [11] uses mobile base stations operating as key distribution 
centers. This scheme is perfectly resilient to node capture 
attacks, because each node pair uses a different key, generated 
and distributed by the base station.  
III. MOBILITY MODELS 
The survey by Camp, Boleng and Davies [12] is one of the 
most important studies on WSN mobility models in literature. 
This study concludes that performance of an ad hoc network 
can vary significantly with different mobility models. Also, 
during the performance evaluations, chosen mobility model 
should closely match the expected real-world scenario. 
Considering these conclusions, we chose the Random Walk 
Mobility Model for entity based mobility and the Reference 
Point Group Mobility Model (RPGM) for group based mobility 
in our simulations. In Random Walk Mobility Model, nodes 
randomly choose a direction and speed from pre-defined ranges 
[12]. They move in that direction for a constant travel time or a 
constant distance, and then choose a different direction and 
speed. In RPGM model, a node is chosen as a logical center 
within each group. Group center chooses a random direction 
and speed and starts moving to the destination. Other nodes 
move to a randomly chosen point, which is in a pre-defined 
radius of the group center.  
IV. PROPOSED DYNAMIC KEY RING UPDATE MECHANISM 
In this section, we present our Dynamic Key Ring Update 
(DKRU) mechanism for mobile wireless sensor networks. Our 
mechanism can be used together with different key pre-
distribution schemes and it can be considered as an extension 
to the shared key discovery phase. The main purpose of our 
mechanism is to enable a sensor node to periodically update its 
key ring according to its neighbors. After each time the shared 
key discovery phase is performed, a node determines on a set 
of keys which are frequent among its neighbors, and requests 
the transmission of these keys from a base station.  As a result, 
during the next shared key discovery phase, the probability of 
sharing common keys with neighbors increases for each node. 
Before a more detailed explanation of our mechanism, the 
list of symbols we use and the pseudo code of our mechanism 
is provided in Table I and Fig. 1 respectively.  The application 
process of DKRU mechanism can be examined in five steps for 
better explanation. These steps will be explained in reference to 
the pseudo code (Fig. 1).  
A. Key Pre-distribution and Deployment 
In this study, we used Du's scheme [4] together with  
-composite scheme [5] as the key pre-distribution basis for 
sensor nodes. Sensor nodes are divided into equally-sized 
groups and a group key pool is prepared for each group. Keys 
in group key pools are selected from a global key pool, 
considering the neighboring relations of groups after 
deployment. Then, a certain number of keys () are distributed 
randomly to each sensor node, from the related group key pool.  
 value for the -composite scheme is set to 2, which means at 
least 2 common keys are required for secure communication of 
two nodes. In addition, base stations share pre-loaded pair wise 
keys with each sensor node and they store all the keys of the 
global key pool in their memory. The pair wise key between 
node i and a base station is denoted as .  
After the key pre-distribution phase, nodes and base 
stations are deployed. As in Du's scheme, grid pattern is used 
in deployment. At each grid cell, a node group is deployed 
following a two dimensional Gaussian distribution. The center 
of each grid cell becomes the deployment point. This part 
covers the steps 1 to 4 in our pseudo code.  
B. Forming the Key Transfer List 
After deployment, sensor nodes try to communicate by 
performing the shared key discovery phase periodically. In 
shared key discovery phase, sensor nodes broadcast the key 
IDs in their key rings to see if they share any common keys 
with their neighbors. Consequently, a node learns the IDs of all 
keys that exist in its neighbors' key rings. Using this 
information, a node can easily calculate the frequency of each 
key that is found in its neighbors' key rings, but not found in 
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TABLE I.  LIST OF SYMBOLS USED IN OUR DKRU MECHANISM 
	  Sensor node i 
 Pairwise key shared between node i and base station (BS) 

 List of the Most  Frequent Keys belonging to node i 
 Key Transfer List belonging to node i 
 List of Remembered Keys belonging to node i 
 Size of the key ring  
 
Minimum number of common  keys required for two neighboring 
nodes to establish a secure communication (a parameter for -
composite scheme)   
 
Number of frequent key IDs added to Key Transfer List from 1-
hop neighbors 
 Probability for adding a frequent key ID to Key Transfer List 
 
Maximum number of keys that a sensor node can transfer from 
the base station at one time (Maximum Transfer Count ) 
	 Node connectivity threshold for key transfer decision 
 Maximum size for List of Remembered Keys 
 Usage count threshold for deletion of keys 
 
its own key ring. The IDs of these keys constitute the List of 
the Most Frequent Keys (
) for this node. Then, these 
frequencies are sorted in decreasing order. Starting with the 
most frequent key, a node selects  number of keys for its 
Key Transfer List (). Each key is selected with a probability 
of . In this initial state,    list consists of the frequent keys 
that are found in 	 's 1-hop neighbors.  This part corresponds 
to steps 6 and 7 in our pseudo code. 
After nodes establish their initial Key Transfer Lists, they 
broadcast these lists to their neighbors. In this way, nodes can 
learn the frequent keys found in their 2-hop neighbors. Nodes 
have a high probability of meeting with their 2-hop neighbors 
in the future steps, so this broadcast operation can be 
considered as an investment in the future. The IDs of unique 
frequent keys coming from the 2-hop neighbors are added to 
the   list.  
At this point, number of key IDs in   list may be more than 
the allowed Maximum Transfer Count (). In this case, 
some of these key IDs are deleted randomly, until the 
Maximum Transfer Count is reached. The reason for adding 
randomness to the process of forming Key Transfer List is to 
prevent the transfer of same set of keys repeatedly. If the 
transfer lists become repetitive, many of the links are secured 
by the same set of keys, which will deteriorate the resiliency of 
network. Another precaution against repetitive transfer lists is 
to have a List of Remembered Keys () in each node. While 
forming the   list, the keys in  list are also checked and 
these keys are certainly excluded from   list. The detailed 
usage of  list will be explained in the next subsection. The 
steps 8, 9 and 10 in our pseudo code corresponds the process of 
finalizing the Key Transfer List for each node. 
C. Deciding on Key Transfer 
After a node forms its Key Transfer List, it decides whether 
it needs to transfer these keys or not, according to its node 
connectivity. Node connectivity is the ratio of number of 
neighbors with which a node shares common keys to the 
number of all neighbors. This ratio can easily be calculated at 
the end of the shared key discovery phase. If the connectivity 
of a node is less than a threshold value (	), this node requests 
the transfer of new keys from the base station. However, if 
connectivity of a node is greater than the 	 threshold, it does 
not transfer any keys. Instead, the key IDs in its Key Transfer 
List () are added to the List of Remembered Keys (). Node 
remembers these keys because when forming the Key Transfer 
List next time, these keys are excluded from the possibility of 
transfer. The purpose of List of Remembered Keys is again to 
prevent the transmission of same set of keys repeatedly. If size 
of the  list has already reached its maximum value (), then 
enough number of keys are deleted from  list, starting with 
the oldest ones. In this way, the latest remembered keys are 
prioritized.  This part covers the step 12 in our pseudo code, 
excluding 12.a.i and 12.a.ii, which will be explained in 
following subsections. 
D. Key Deletion Process 
Another property of our mechanism is that the size of the 
key ring of a node never exceeds the predefined key ring size 
. Before a node transfers new keys, it deletes the required 
number of existing keys. Key deletion process has two steps. 
For the first step, each node stores  key usage count values for 
all of its keys. Key usage count is calculated as the number of 
times a key is used in securing links. Keys are deleted if their 
usage count exceeds a predefined threshold (). This step is 
executed regardless of the key transfer decision, After this step, 
if the node is going to transfer new keys and if it does not have 
enough space in its key ring, then it deletes some of its existing 
keys starting with the earliest used ones, until enough space is 
created for new keys. Key transfer operation is performed after 
the key deletion process. Hence, key ring size can never exceed 
. The steps 11 and 12.a.i in our pseudo code corresponds to 
this key deletion process. 
E. Performing Key Transfer 
When a sensor node wants to request the keys in its   list 
from the base station, the node encrypts the requested key IDs 
with key  and sends this message to the base station. Base 
station sends these keys to sensor node again by encrypting 
them with key . The number of keys that a sensor node 
can request from the base station at one time cannot exceed the 
Maximum Transfer Count (). This part corresponds to the 
step 12.a.ii in our pseudo code. 
After the key transfer operation is performed, or the keys in  
  list are added to the  list; node prepares itself for the next 
shared key discovery phase by clearing the 
 and   lists.  
The main assumptions of this mechanism are as follows. 
Base stations are tamper-proof and they cannot be captured by 
an attacker. In addition, we assumed that each node can 
directly communicate with a base station in its communication 
range.  
These assumptions require a powerful base station with 
high memory capacity and large communication range. The 
number of base stations needed depends on the wireless 
communication range of the base stations and the area of the 
deployment zone. 
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1- Nodes and base stations are pre-distributed with keys. Then they are deployed to the deployment area.   
2- During the movement of nodes, the following steps are executed periodically: 
 3- Shared key discovery phase is performed. 
 4- Sensor node pairs, who share at least  common keys, establish a secure communication using all their shared keys.   
 5- For each node 	; 
  6- The Most Frequent Keys list (
) is formed and sorted in decreasing order. 
  7- Starting with the first key in 
,  number of keys are added to Key Transfer List (), each with a probability of . 
  8-  list is sent to neighboring nodes and their lists are received.  
  9- According to the  lists coming from neighbors and the Remembered Keys list (),  list is updated.    
  10- If the size of  list is greater than , some of the keys in  list are deleted randomly, until the size of the list  
  becomes equal to  .  
  11- Keys that exceed the usage count () are deleted from key ring.  
  12- Node connectivity is calculated. 
   12.a- If node connectivity is below the 	 threshold, the keys in  list will be transferred; 
    12.a.i- If there is not enough space in key ring for the transfer of new keys, some of the current keys are 
    deleted, starting with the earliest used ones.   
    12.a.ii- The keys in   list are transferred from the Base Station. 
   12.b- If node connectivity is above the 	 threshold, the keys in   list are added to the  list. If the size of  
   list becomes greater than , the oldest keys in  list are deleted, until enough space is opened for the latest  
   remembered keys. 
  13- 
 and  lists are cleared.  
Fig 1. Pseudo code for DKRU mechanism
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
The performance of our mechanism is evaluated via 
simulations, using C# for code development.  A comparative 
analysis of Du's scheme with and without Dynamic Key Ring 
Update (DKRU) mechanism is given in subsections. Both 
random walk and RPGM mobility models are evaluated 
separately in each subsection.  The common parameters and 
system configuration are as follows. Additional parameters are 
given in Table II. 
• The number of sensor nodes in the network is 10,000. 
• Deployment area is 1,000	 × 	1,000 square meters. 
• Deployment area is divided into a grid of 10 × 10 cells; 
each cell has a group of 100 nodes in initial deployment.  
• Size of the global key pool is 100,000. 
• Size of the key pool for each group of nodes is 1789. 
• Two horizontally and vertically neighboring key pools 
share exactly  0.2 × 1789 keys. 
• Two diagonally neighboring key pools share exactly 
	0.05 × 1789 keys. 
• Two non-neighboring key pools share no keys. 
• Wireless communication range of sensor nodes is 40 m. 
• Nodes are deployed to the grid cells using two dimensional 
Gaussian distribution. 
• For mobility models, minimum and maximum speeds of 
nodes are 5 and 15 meters/minute, respectively. 
TABLE II.  LIST OF OTHER PARAMETERS USED IN SIMULATIONS  
 Du's scheme DKRU with RPGM DKRU with  random walk 
 300 300 300 
 - 3 3 
 - 0.6 0.6 
 - 10 10 
	 - 0.9 0.9 
 - 80 80 
 - 200 150 
A. Global Connectivity Analysis 
WSNs can also be viewed as key-sharing graphs where 
nodes are the vertices and secure links are the edges. Global 
connectivity is defined as the ratio of the size of the largest 
isolated component in this graph to the size of the whole 
network [4]. Nodes that are not connected to largest isolated 
component are considered as disconnected from the secure 
network. Hence, it is important to have high global 
connectivity in a network.  
When global connectivity of Du's scheme is examined for 
RPGM model, it can be seen that even the network is fully 
connected at the beginning, in a short amount of time, only 
10% of the network remains connected. This major decline 
results from the fact that two non-neighboring key pools do not 
share any keys in Du's scheme.  When the initially non-
neighboring groups become neighbors due to mobility, they 
cannot communicate and each group forms its own isolated 
component, which constitutes only 10% of the network.  Our 
mechanism fixes this issue because nodes update their key 
rings according to their new neighbors. In Fig. 2, it can be seen 
that our mechanism provides almost perfect network 
connectivity for RPGM model.   
     In the random walk mobility model, global connectivity 
does not decrease significantly for Du's scheme. The reason is 
that because each node selects a new direction and speed 
periodically and randomly, they mostly stay in the same 
neighborhood. Their neighborhood consists of the vertically, 
horizontally and diagonally neighboring grid cells. Because the 
key pools of these cells have some overlapping, nodes can 
continue to establish secure links between them. As shown in 
Fig. 3, our mechanism also provides almost perfect global 
connectivity for this mobility model.  
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Fig. 2. Global connectivity versus time for RPGM model 
 
 
 Fig. 3. Global connectivity versus time for random walk mobility model 
 
B. Local Connectivity Analysis 
We define local connectivity as the probability of two 
neighboring nodes being able to find at least 2 common keys to 
establish a secure communication link between them. Path key 
establishment phase is not taken into consideration in the 
computation of local connectivity, due to its high 
communication overhead. Hence, it is important for a network 
to achieve good local connectivity using shared key discovery 
phase alone. Moreover, path key establishment phase should be 
avoided in MWSNs because it involves much more 
communication and computational overheads compared to 
static WSNs [10].  
Despite the fact that location based key distribution 
schemes provide better local connectivity than the probabilistic 
schemes for static WSNs, same situation is not valid for 
MWSNs. In Fig. 4 and 5, it can be seen that the local 
connectivity of Du's scheme decreases from 90% to 30% over 
time for both mobility models. This decrease is sharper for 
RPGM model because neighboring relationships break off 
faster in this model.  When the DKRU mechanism is added to 
Du's scheme, local connectivity can be improved to 60% in 
steady state, without requiring any increase in key ring size.  
 
 
Fig. 4. Local connectivity versus time for RPGM model 
 
 
Fig. 5. Local connectivity versus time for random walk mobility model 
 
C. Resiliency Analysis 
One of the most important security threats for WSNs is the 
physical capture of sensor nodes by an attacker. Because the 
sensor nodes are not tamper proof, the attacker can access the 
key rings of sensor nodes and decrypt their communication. 
Moreover, these compromised keys may be used in 
communication links of non-captured nodes, too. In this case, 
the attacker can also decrypt the communications among non-
captured nodes. 
Resiliency of a network is inversely proportional to the 
amount of compromised links between non-captured nodes. In 
resiliency analysis, it is assumed that when an attacker captures 
a node, it retrieves all the keys in the node's key ring. Also, 
attacker has the ability to eavesdrop all message exchanges in 
the network. However, our attack model does not involve an 
active attacker who manipulates captured nodes to do further 
actions. In our simulations, attacker captures one node in each 
minute. Then we compute the ratio of additionally 
compromised links due to these node captures.  
For the RPGM model, Du's scheme has very low global 
and local connectivity. Due to this low connectivity of 
network, it is hard to make judgments about the resiliency of 
network. As shown in Fig. 6, additionally compromised links 
ratio for Du's scheme is close to zero after 200 minutes of 
simulation. However, this does not indicate that the network is 
resilient. Actually, this indicates that there are not enough links 
in the network to be compromised. On the other hand, our 
mechanism provides high local and global connectivity for this 
mobility model. Despite this high connectivity, additionally 
compromised links ratio reaches only to 0.1 in our mechanism. 
This means, about 90% of the communication links between 
non-captured nodes are still secure.  
 
 
Fig. 6. Additionally compromised links ratio versus time for RPGM model 
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 Fig. 7. Additionally compromised links ratio versus time for random walk 
mobility model 
 
For the random walk mobility model, Fig. 7 shows that the 
additionally compromised links ratio of our mechanism is 
almost equal to the Du's scheme, except for a slight increase 
towards the end of the simulation. These results demonstrate 
that application of our mechanism does not significantly 
deteriorate the resiliency of network.  
D. Communication Overhead Analysis 
Communication overhead can be defined as the average 
number of bytes sent and received by a node at each shared key 
discovery phase. Without the DKRU mechanism, a node 
sends/receives all of the key IDs to/from its neighbors for 
shared key discovery phase. However, using DKRU 
mechanism results in additional communications. Firstly, nodes 
send the key IDs in their initial Key Transfer Lists to their 
neighbors and receive the key IDs from their neighbors.  
parameter affects the communication overhead of this step. 
Secondly, if a node is going to perform key transfer, it sends 
the requested key IDs to the base station and receives the 
encrypted keys.	 parameter is important here because it 
determines how many keys will be requested from base station. 
In our computations, we considered 4-byte key IDs and 32-byte 
keys. As it can be seen in Fig. 8 and 9, communication 
overhead of our mechanism is very close to the communication 
overhead of Du's scheme. The reason is that,  and  
parameters do not require high values.  
 
 
Fig. 8. Communication overhead versus time for RPGM model 
 
 
Fig. 9. Communication overhead versus time for random walk mobility model 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we proposed Dynamic Key Ring Update 
(DKRU) mechanism for MWSNs. Our mechanism can be used 
together with different key pre-distribution schemes and it 
increases the local and global connectivity values of these 
schemes. Due to the mobile nature of network, neighbors of a 
node change continuously. Yet, DKRU mechanism helps 
sensor nodes to adapt to the network, regardless of their pre-
deployment key distribution model. Using DKRU mechanism, 
a sensor node can update its key ring by observing the most 
frequent keys in its 1-hop and 2-hop neighbors' key rings. In 
this study, we explained our mechanism and we analyzed its 
performance when it is used together with Du's scheme, 
comparatively. We used two different mobility models for 
performance analysis. Our simulations show that DKRU 
mechanism provides a significant increase to local and global 
connectivity of Du's scheme in mobile case. Moreover, our 
mechanism does not cause an important decrease in the 
resiliency of network.  
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